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1. Introduction 
Public key cryptography is an important technique to realize network and 
information security. Traditional public key infrastructure requires a trusted 
certification authority to issue a certificate binding the identity and the public key 
of an entity. Hence, the problem of certificate management arises. To solve the 
problem, Shamir defined a new public key paradigm called identity-based public 
key cryptography [1]. However, identity-based public key cryptography needs a 
trusted KGC to generate a private key for an entity according to his identity. So 
we are confronted with the key escrow problem. Fortunately, the two problems in 
traditional public key infrastructure and identity-based public key cryptography 
can be prohibited by introducing certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) 
[2], which can be conceived as an intermediate between traditional public key 
infrastructure and identity-based cryptography. 
The first certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement(CTAKA) 
protocol appears in the seminal paper by Al-Riyami and Pa-terson [2]. However, 
no formal security model or proof for this CTAKA protocol is provided. Some 
early certificateless key exchange protocols (e.g., [3-6]) are proposed with 
heuristic security analysis. In order to improve the security, Swanson [7] proposed 
the first formal security model for the CTAKA protocol. Swanson also pointed 
that several early proposed CTAKA protocols[3-6] are insecure in his model. In 
[8], Lippold et al. proposed a new security model for CTAKA protocol. They also 
proposed a CTAKE protocol and prove its security under their model. Compared 
with the model by Swanson, Lippold et al.'s model is stronger in the sense that 
after the adversary replaces the public key of a user, the user will use the new 
public/private key pair in the rest of the game, while in Swanson's model, the user 
keeps using his/her original public/private key pair. However, the performance of 
Lippold et al.'s protocol is unacceptable. Very recently, Zhang et al.[9] proposed a 
different security model. They also proposed an efficient CTAKA protocol and 
demonstrated that their protocol is probably secure in their model. 
All the above CTAKA protocols [2-9] are from bilinear pairings and the 
pairing is regarded as an expensive cryptography primitive. The relative 
computation cost of a pairing is approximately twenty times higher than that of 
the scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group [10]. Therefore, CTAKA 
protocols without bilinear pairings would be more appealing in terms of 
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efficiency. Recently, several certificateless key exchange protocols without 
pairing have been proposed in [11-14]. However, Yang et al.[13] pointed both of 
Geng et al.’s protocol[11] and Hou et al.’s protocol[12] are not secure. They 
proposed an improved CTAKA protocol. He et al. [14] also proposed an CTAKA 
protocol without pairing. Unfortunately, Han [15] demonstrated that their scheme 
is not secure against the type 1 adversary. 
In this paper, we propose a new CTAKA protocol without pairings. The user 
in our protocol just needs to compute five elliptic curve scale multiplications to 
end the key agreement. Then our protocol has the best performance among the 
CTAKA protocols. We also show our protocol is provably secure under the 
random oracle model.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some 
preliminaries. In Section 3, we propose our certificateless authenticated key 
agreement protocol. The security analysis of the proposed protocol is presented in 
Section 4. In Section 5, performance analysis is presented. Conclusions are given 
in Section 6. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1 Background of elliptic curve group 
Let the symbol / pE F  denote an elliptic curve E  over a prime finite field 
pF , defined by an equation  
baxxy ++= 32 ， pFba ∈,                                  (1) 
and with the discriminant  
3 24 27 0a bΔ = + ≠ .                                        (2) 
The points on / pE F  together with an extra point O  called the point at 
infinity form a group  
{( , ) : , , ( , ) 0} { }pG x y x y F E x y O= ∈ = ∪ .                        (3) 
Let the order of G  be n . G is a cyclic additive group under the point 
addition “+” defined as follows: Let ,P Q G∈ , l  be the line containing P  and 
Q  (tangent line to / pE F  if P  = Q ), and R , the third point of intersection of 
l  with / pE F . Let l′  be the line connecting R  and O . Then P  “+” Q  is 
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the point such that l′  intersects / pE F  at R  and O  and P “+” Q. Scalar 
multiplication over / pE F  can be computed as follows:  
(  )tP P P P t times= + + +…                                   (4). 
The following problems defined over G  are assumed to be intractable 
within polynomial time. 
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: Given a generator P  of 
G  and ( , )aP bP  for unknown *, R na b Z∈ , compute abP . The CDH assumption 
states that the probability of any polynomial-time algorithm to solve the CDH 
problem is negligible. 
2.2 CTAKA protocol 
A CTAKA protocol consists of six polynomial-time algorithms[2, 8]: Setup, 
Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key 
and Key-Agreement. These algorithms are defined as follows. 
Setup: This algorithm takes security parameter k  as input and returns the 
system parameters params and master key. 
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm takes params , master key and 
a user's identity iID  as inputs and returns a partial private key iD . 
Set-Secret-Value: This algorithm takes params  and a user's identity iID as 
inputs, and generates a secret value ix . 
Set-Private-Key:  This algorithm takes params , a user's partial private key 
iD  and his secret value ix  as inputs, and outputs the full private key iS . 
Set-Public-Key: This algorithm takes params and a user's secret value ix as 
inputs, and generates a public key iP  for the user. 
Key-Agreement: This is a probabilistic polynomial-time interactive algorithm 
which involves two entities A  and B . The inputs are the system parameters 
params for both A  and B , plus ( , ,A A AS ID P ) for A , and ( , ,B B BS ID P ) for B . 
Here, AS , BS  are the respective private keys of A  and B ; AID  is the identity 
of A  and BID  is the identity of B ; AP , BP  are the respective public key of 
A  and B . Eventually, if the protocol does not fail, A  and B will obtain a 
secret session key AB BAK K K= = . 
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2.3 Security model for CTAKA protocols 
In CTAKA, as defined in [2], there are two types of adversaries with different 
capabilities, we assume Type 1 Adversary,  A 1 acts as a dishonest user while 
Type 2 Adversary, A 2 acts as a malicious KGC: 
Type 1 Adversary: Adversary A 1 does not have access to the master key, but 
A 1 can replace the public keys of any entity with a value of his choice, since 
there is no certificate involved in CLPKC. 
Type 2 Adversary: Adversary A 2 has access to the master key, but cannot 
replace any user's public key. 
Very recently, Zhang et al.’s [8] present a security model for AKA protocols 
in the setting of CLPKC. The model is defined by the following game between a 
challenger C and an adversary  A ∈{ A 1, A 2}.  In their et al.’s model, A is 
modeled by a probabilistic polynomial-time turing machine. All communications 
go through the adversary A. Participants only respond to the queries by A and do 
not communicate directly among themselves. A can relay, modify, delay, 
interleave or delete all the message flows in the system. Note that A can act as a 
benign adversary, which means that A is deterministic and restricts her action to 
choosing a pair of oracles ,
n
i j∏  and ,tj i∏  and then faithfully conveying each 
message flow from one oracle to the other. Furthermore, A may ask a 
polynomially bounded number of the following queries as follows. 
( )iCreate ID : This allows A to ask C to set up a new participant i with 
identity iID . On receiving such a query, C generates the public/private key pair 
for i . 
( )iPublic Key ID− : A can request the public key of a participant i  whose 
identity is iID . To respond, C outputs the public key iP  of participant i . 
iPartial - Private - Key(ID ) : A can request the partial private key of a 
participant i  whose identity is iID . To respond, C outputs the partial private 
key iD  of participant i . 
( )iCorrupt ID : A can request the private key of a participant i  whose 
identity is iID . To respond, C  outputs the private key iS  of participant i . 
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( , )i iPublic Key Replacement ID P′− − : For a participant i  whose identity is 
iID ; A can choose a new public key P′  and then set P′  as the new public key 
of this participant. C will record these replacements which will be used later. 
,( , )
n
i jSend M∏ : A can send a message M  of her choice to an oracle, say 
,
n
i j∏ , in which case participant i  assumes that the message has been sent by 
participant j . A may also make a special Send query with M λ≠  to an oracle 
,
n
i j∏ , which instructs i  to initiate a protocol run with j . An oracle is an initiator 
oracle if the first message it has received is λ . If an oracle does not receive a 
message λ  as its first message, then it is a responder oracle. 
,( )
n
i jReveal ∏ : A can ask a particular oracle to reveal the session key (if any) 
it currently holds to A. 
,( )
n
i jTest ∏ : At some point, A may choose one of the oracles, say ,TI J∏ , to 
ask a single Test query. This oracle must be fresh. To answer the query, the oracle 
flips a fair coin {0,1}b∈ , and returns the session key held by ,TI J∏  if 0b = , or a 
random sample from the distribution of the session key if 1b = . 
After a Test query, the adversary can continue to query the oracles except that 
it cannot make a Reveal query to the test oracle ,
T
I J∏  or to ,tJ I∏  who has a 
matching conversation with ,
T
I J∏  (if it exists), and it cannot corrupt participant 
J . In addition, if A is a Type 1 adversary, A cannot request the partial private 
key of the participant J ; and if A is a Type 2 adversary, J  cannot replace the 
public key of the participant J . At the end of the game, A must output a guess 
bit b′ . A wins if and only if b b′ = . A’s advantage to win the above game, 
denoted by ( )AAdvantage k , is defined as: 1( ) Pr[ ]
2
AAdvantage k b b′= − − . 
Definition 1. A CTAKA protocol is said to be secure if: 
(1) In the presence of a benign adversary on ,
n
i j∏  and ,tj i∏ , both oracles 
always agree on the same session key, and this key is distributed uniformly at 
random. 
(2) For any adversary, ( )AAdvantage k  is negligible. 
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3. Our protocol 
In this section, we will propose a new CTAKA protocol. Our protocol 
consists of six polynomial-time algorithms. They are described as follows. 
Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter k as in put, and returns 
system parameters and a master key. Given k , KGC does the following.  
1) KGC chooses a k -bit prime p  and determines the tuple 
{ , / , , }p pF E F G P  as defined in Secttion 2.1. 
2) KGC chooses the master private key *ns Z∈  and computes the master 
public key pubP sP= . 
3) KGC chooses two cryptographic secure hash functions * *1 :{0,1} nH Z→  
and * *2 :{0,1} nH Z→ . 
4) KGC publishes 1 2{ , / , , , , , }p p pubparams F E F G P P H H=  as system 
parameters and secretly keeps the master key s . 
Set-Secret-Value: The user with identity iID  picks randomly 
*
i nx Z∈ , 
computes i iP x P= ⋅  and sets ix  as his secret value. 
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm takes master key, a user’s 
identifier, iP , system parameters as input, and returns the user’s ID-based private 
key. With this algorithm, for each user with identifier iID , KGC works as 
follows. 
1) KGC chooses a random number *i nr Z∈ , computes i iR r P= ⋅  and 
1( , , )i i i ih H ID R P= . 
2) KGC computes modi i is r h s n= +  and issues { , }i is R  to the users 
through secret channel. 
The user’s s partial private key is the tuple is  and he can validate her private 
key by checking whether the equation i i i pubs P R h P⋅ = + ⋅  holds. The private key 
is valid if the equation holds and vice versa. 
Set-Private-Key: The user with identity iID  takes the pair ( , )i i isk x s=  as 
its private key. 
Set-Public-Key: The user with identity iID  takes { , }i i ipk P R=  as its 
public key. 
Key-Agreement: Assume that an entity A  with identity AID  has private 
key ( , )A A Ask x s=  and public key { , }A A Apk P R=  and an entity B  with 
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identity BID  has private key ( , )B B Bsk x s=  and public key { , }B B Bpk P R=  
want to establish a session key, then they can do, as shown in Fig.1, as follows. 
1) A  chooses a random number *na Z∈  and computes AT a P= ⋅ , then A  
send 1 { , }A AM ID T=  to B . 
2) After receiving 1M , B  chooses a random number 
*
nb Z∈  and computes 
BT b P= ⋅ , then B  send 2 { , }B BM ID T=  to A . 
Then both A  and B  can compute the shared secrets as follows. 
A  computes  
1
1( ) ( ( , , ) )AB A A B B B B B B pubK x s T a P R H ID R P P= + + ⋅ + +  and 2AB BK a T= ⋅   (5) 
B  computes 
1
1( ) ( ( , , ) )BA B B A A A A A A pubK x s T b P R H ID R P P= + + ⋅ + +  and 2BA AK b T= ⋅   (6) 
 
Fig. 1. Key agreement of our protocol 
The shared secrets agree because: 
1
1
1
1
( ) ( ( , , ) )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ( , , ) ) ( )
AB A A B B B B B B pub
A A B B B A A B B B A
A A A A A pub B B A
BA
K x s T a P R H ID R P P
x s T a x s P x s T x s T
b P R H ID R P P P x s T
K
= + + ⋅ + +
= + + + = + + +
= ⋅ + + + +
=
               (7) 
and 
2 2
AB BAK abP baP K= = =                                        (8) 
Thus the agreed session key for A  and B  can be computed as: 
1 2
2
1 2
2
( || || || || || )
( || || || || || )
A B A B AB AB
A B A B BA BA
sk H ID ID T T K K
H ID ID T T K K
=
=                           (9) 
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4. Security Analysis 
To prove the security of our protocol in the random oracle model, we treats 
1H  and 2H  as two random oracles [16] using the model defined in [9]. For the 
security, the following lemmas and theorems are provided. 
Lemma 1. If two oracles are matching, both of them will be accepted and 
will get the same session key which is distributed uniformly at random in the 
session key sample space. 
Proof. From the correction analysis of our protocol in section 4.1, we know if 
two oracles are matching, then both of them are accepted and have the same 
session key. The session key is distributed uniformly since a  and b  are 
selected uniformly during the protocol execution. 
Lemma 2. Assuming that the CDH problem is intractable, the advantage of a 
Type 1 adversary against our protocol is negligible in the random oracle model.  
Proof. Suppose that there is a Type 1 Adversary A 1 who can win the game 
defined in Section 2 with a non-negligible advantage ( )AAdvantage k  in 
polynomial-time t . Then,  A 1 can win the game with non-negligible 
probability ε , we show how to use the ability of A 1 to construct an algorithm C 
to solve the CDH problem. 
Suppose C is given an instance ( , )aP bP  of the CDH problem, and wants to 
compute cP with modc ab n= . C first chooses 0P G∈  at random, sets 0P  as 
the system public key pubP , selects the system parameter 
1 2{ , / , , , , , }p p pubparams F E F G P P H H=  ,and sends params  to A 1. Let sq  be 
the maximal number of sessions each participant may be involved in. Supposed 
A1 makes at most 
iH
q  times iH  queries and creates at most cq  participants. 
C chooses at random 
1
, [1, ]HI J q∈ , [1, ]sT q∈ , and  answers  A 1’s queries as 
follows. 
( )iCreate ID : C maintains an initially empty list CL  consisting of tuples of 
the form ( , , ,i i i iID D x P ). If i IID ID= , C chooses a random *,i i nx h Z∈  and 
computes 0i iR bP h P= − , public key i iP x P= , then i ’s partial private key, 
private key and  public key are ⊥ , ( , )i isk x= ⊥  and ( , )i i ipk P R=  separately. 
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Otherwise, C chooses a random *, ,i i i nx s h Z∈  and computes 0i i iR s P h P= − ,  
i iP x P= , then i ’s partial private key, private key and  public key are is , 
( , )i i isk x s=  and ( , )i i ipk P R=  separately. At last, C adds the tuple 
( , , ,i i i iID R P h ) and ( , , ,i i i iID s sk pk ) to the list 1HL  and CL , separately. 
1( , , )i i iH ID R P :  C maintains an initially empty list 1HL  which contains 
tuples of the form ( , , ,i i i iID R P h ). If ( , ,i i iID R P ) is on the list 1HL , then returns 
ih . Otherwise, C executes the query ( )iCreate ID  and returns ih . 
( )iPublic Key ID− : On receiving this query, C first searches for a tuple 
( , , ,i i i iID s sk pk ) in CL  which is indexed by iID , then returns ipk  as the 
answer. 
( )iPartial Private Key ID− − : Whenever C receives this query, if i IID ID=  
C  aborts; else, C searches for a tuple ( , , ,i i i iID s sk pk ) in CL  which is indexed 
by iID  and returns isk  as the answer. 
( )iCorrupt ID : Whenever C receives this query, if i IID ID=  C aborts. 
Otherwise, C searches for a tuple ( , , ,i i i iID s sk pk ) in CL  which is indexed by 
iID  and if ix null= , C returns null. Otherwise, C returns ( ,i is sk ) as the answer. 
( , )i iPublic Key Replacement ID pk′− − : On receiving this query, C  searches 
for a tuple ( , , ,i i i iID s sk pk ) in CL  which is indexed by iID , then updates ipk  
to ipk′  and sets ,i is sk=⊥ =⊥ . 
,( , )
n
i jSend M∏ : C maintains an initially empty list SL  consisting of tuples of 
the form ( , , ,, ,
n n n
i j i j i jtrans r∏ ), where ,ni jtrans  is the transcript of ,ni j∏  so far and 
,
n
i jr  will be described later. C answers the query as follows: 
z If n T= , i IID ID=  and j JID ID= , C returns aP  as the answer and 
updates the tuple ( , , ,, ,
n n n
i j i j i jtrans r∏ )  ,ni jr =⊥ . 
z Otherwise, C answers the query according to the specification of the 
protocol. Note that when M  is not the second message to ,
n
i j∏ , C 
chooses at random *,
n
i j nr Z∈  and computes ,ni jr P  as the reply. Then C 
updates the tuple indexed by ,
n
i j∏  in SL . 
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,( )
n
i jReveal ∏ : C maintains a list RL  of the form 
( , ,, , , , ,
n n n n n n
i j ini resp ini resp i jID ID T T SK∏ ) where niniID  is the identification of the initiator 
in the session which ,
n
i j∏  engages in and nrespID  is the identification of the 
responder. C answers the query as follows: 
z If n T= , i IID ID=  and j JID ID=  or ,ni j∏  is the oracle who has a 
matching conversion with ,
T
I J∏ , C aborts. 
z Else if i IID ID≠ ,  
 C looks up the list SL   and CL for corresponding tuple 
, , , ,( , , , , , , , )
n n n n n n n n
i j i j i j j i i j i jr T T R R P P∏  and ( , , ,i i i iID D x P ) separately. Then 
C computes 1, , , 1( ) ( ( || ) )
n n n n n
i j i i j i j i j j j j pubK x s T r P R H ID R P= + + + + , 
1
, , ,
n n
i j j i j iK r T= . 
 C makes a 2H  query. If ,ni j∏  is the initiator oracle then the query 
is of the form ( 1 2, ,|| || || || ||i j i j i j i jID ID T T K K ) or else of the form 
( 1 2, ,|| || || || ||j i j i i j i jID ID T T K K ). 
z Else ( i IID ID= ),  
 C looks up the list SL   for corresponding tuple 
, , , ,( , , , , , , , )
n n n n n n n n
i j i j i j j i i j i jr T T R R P P∏ . 
 C looks up the list 
2H
L  to see if there exists a tuple index by 
( , , ,i j i jID ID T T ). If ,
n
i j∏  is an initiator, otherwise index by 
( , , ,j i j iID ID T T ). 
 If there exists such tuple and the corresponding 1,i jK  and 2,i jK  
satisfies the equation 2,( , ) ( , )
n n
i j i je K P e T T=  and 
1
, , 1 1( ( ( || || ) , ) ( ( || || ) ,
n n n n n n n n n n
i j i j j j j j j pub i i i i i pub je K r P R H ID R P P P e P R H ID R P P T− + + = + +
given a proper bilinear map e  for group G , then C obtains the 
corresponding ih  and sets ,
n
i jSK = ih . Otherwise C chooses at 
random , {0,1}
n k
i jSK ∈ . 
2H  query: C maintains a list 2HL  of the form (
1 2, , , , , ,i j i ju u u u u u uID ID T T K K h ) 
and A responds with 2H  queries (
1 2, , , , ,i j i ju u u u u uID ID T T K K ) as follows: 
z If a tuple indexed by ( 1 2, , , , ,i j i ju u u u u uID ID T T K K ) is already in 2HL , C 
replies with the corresponding uh . 
z Else, if there is no such a tuple, 
 If the equation 2( , ) ( , )i ju u ue K P e T T= and 
1
1 1( , ) ( ( || || ) , ) ( ( || || ) , )
j i
u i i i i i pub u j j j j j pub ue K P e P R H ID R P P T e P R H ID R P P T= + + + +
hold given a proper bilinear pairing e for group G , go through the 
list RL .  If there is such a tuple indexed by ( , , ,
i j i j
u u u uID ID T T ) in the 
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list RL , then C obtains the corresponding ,
n
i jSK  and sets 
,
n
i j uSK h= .Otherwise C chooses at random {0,1}kuh ∈ . 
 Else if the equations do not hold for ( 1 2, , , , ,i j i ju u u u u uID ID T T K K ),C 
chooses at random {0,1}kuh ∈ . 
 C inserts the tuple ( 1 2, , , , , ,i j i ju u u u u u uID ID T T K K h ) into the list 2HL . 
,( )
T
I JTest ∏ : At some point, C will ask a Test query on some oracle. If C does 
not choose one of the oracles ,
T
I J∏  to ask the Test query, then C aborts. 
Otherwise, C simply outputs a random value {0,1}kx∈ . 
The probability that C chooses ,
T
I J∏  as the Test oracle and that 21
C sq q
. In this 
case, C would not have made ,( )
T
I JCorrupt ∏  or ,( )TI JReveal ∏ queries, and so C 
would not have aborted. If C can win in such a game, then C must have made the 
corresponding H2 query of the form ( 1 2, , , , ,i j i jT T T T T TID ID T T K K ). If ,
T
I J∏  is the 
initiator oracle or else ( 1 2, , , , ,j i j iT T T T T TID ID T T K K ) with overwhelming probability 
because 2H  is a random oracle. Thus C can find the corresponding item in the 
2H -list with the probability 
2
1
Hq
 and output 
1
,( )( ) ( )
T
T I I I J J J J pubK x h aP r P R h P− − − + +  as a solution to the CDH problem. The 
probability that C solves the CDH problem is 
2
2
C s Hq q q
ε . 
Lemma 3. Under the assumption that the CDH problem is intractable, the 
advantage of a Type 2 adversary against our protocol is negligible in the random 
oracle model.  
Proof. Suppose that there is a Type 2 adversary A 2 who can win the game 
defined in Section 2 with a non-negligible advantage ( )AAdvantage k  in 
polynomial-time t . Then,  A 2 can win the game with no-negligible probability 
ε , we show how to use the ability of A 2 to construct an algorithm C to solve the 
CDH problem. 
Suppose C is given an instance ( , )aP bP  of the CDH problem, and want to 
compute cP with modc ab n= . C first chooses sP G∈  at random, sets sP  as 
the system public key pubP , selects the system parameter 
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1 2{ , / , , , , , }p p pubparams F E F G P P H H=  ,and sends params  and master key s  
to A 2. Let sq  be the maximal number of sessions each participant may be 
involved in. Supposed A2 makes at most 
iH
q  times iH  queries and creates at 
most cq  participants. C chooses at random 1, [1, ]HI J q∈ , [1, ]sT q∈ , and  
answers  A 2’s queries as follows. 
( )iCreate ID : C maintains an initially empty list CL  consisting of tuples of 
the form ( , , ,i i i iID s sk pk ). If i IID ID= , C chooses a random *,i i nr h Z∈  and 
computes i iR r P= , modi i is r h s n= + , iP bP= , then i ’s partial private key,  
private key  and public key  are is , ( , )i isk s= ⊥  and { , }i i ipk P R=  
separately. Otherwise, C chooses a random *, ,i i i nx r h Z∈  and computes i iR r P= , 
modi i is r h s n= + , public key i iP x P= , then i ’s partial private key,  private key  
and public key  are is , ( , )i i isk x s=  and { , }i i ipk P R=  separately. At last, C 
add the tuple ( , , ,i i i iID R P h ) and ( , , ,i i i iID s sk pk ) to the list 1HL  and CL , 
separately. 
C answers  A 2’s 1( , , )i i iH ID R P , ( )iPublic Key ID− , ( )iCorrupt ID , 
( )iPartial Private Key ID− − , ,( , )ni jSend M∏ , ,( )ni jReveal ∏ , 2H  query and 
,( )
T
I JTest ∏  queries like he does in lemma 2.  
The probability that C chooses ,
T
I J∏  as the Test oracle and that 21
C sq q
. In this 
case, C would not have made ,( )
T
I JCorrupt ∏  or ,( )TI JReveal ∏ queries, and so C 
would not have aborted. If C can win in such a game, then C must have made the 
corresponding H2 query of the form ( 1 2, , , , ,i j i jT T T T T TID ID T T K K ) if ,
T
I J∏  is the 
initiator oracle or else ( 1 2, , , , ,j i j iT T T T T TID ID T T K K ) with overwhelming probability 
because 2H  is a random oracle. Thus C can find the corresponding item in the 
2H -list with the probability 
2
1
Hq
 and output 1 ,( ) ( )
T
T I I J J J J pubK s bP r P R h P− − + +  
as a solution to the CDH problem. The probability that C solves the CDH 
problem is 
2
2
C s Hq q q
ε . 
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From the above three lemmas, we can get the following two theorems. 
Theorem 1. Our protocol is a secure CTAKA protocol. 
Through the similar method, we can prove our protocol could provide forward 
secrecy property. We will describe it in the following theorem. 
Theorem 2. Our protocol has the perfect forward secrecy property if the CDH 
problem in G  is hard. 
5. Comparison with previous protocol 
For the convenience of evaluating the computational cost, we define some 
notations as follows. 
mulT : The time of executing a scalar multiplication operation of point. 
addT : The time of executing an addition operation of points. 
invT : The time of executing a modular invasion operation. 
hT : The time of executing a one-way hash function. 
We will compare the efficiency of our new protocol with there CTAKA 
protocols without pairings, i.e. Geng et al.’s protocol [11], Hou et al.’s protocol 
[12], Yang et al.’s protocol[13], and He et al.’s protocol[14]. In Table 1, we 
summarize the performance results of the proposed user authentication and key 
exchange protocol.  
Table 1. Comparison of different protocols 
 Geng et al.’s 
protocol [11]
Hou et al.’s 
protocol [12]
Yang et al.’s 
protocol [13]
He et al’s 
protocol[14] 
Our protocol
Cost 7 2mul hT T+ 6 2mul hT T+ 9 2mul hT T+ 5 3
2
mul add
inv h
T T
T T
+
+ +  
5 4
2
mul add
h
T T
T
+
+
As the main computational overheads, we only consider the scale 
multiplication. Then we can conclude the computational cost of our protocol is 
71.43% of Geng et al.’s scheme [11], 83.33% of Hou et al.’s scheme[12], and 
55.56% of Yang et al.’s scheme[13]. Moreover, Geng et al.’s protocol [11] and 
Hou et al.’s protocol[12] are not secure[13]. He et al.’s protocol [14] has almost 
the same performance as our protocol. But He et al.’s protocol [14] is not secure 
either [15]. Thus our scheme is more useful and efficient than the previous 
schemes. 
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6. Conclusion 
The certificateless public key cryptography is receiving significant attention 
because it is a new paradigm that simplifies the public key cryptography. We then 
proposed a new CTAKA protocol without pairings and proved its security in the 
random oracle model under the CDH assumption. The proposed protocol has the 
best performance among the related protocols.  
Many researchers have expressed doubts about the wisdom of relying on the 
random oracle model. In particular, Canetti et al. [17] proved that there are 
signature and encryption schemes which are secure in the random oracle model, 
but insecure for any instantiation of the standard oracle. To get better security, it is 
necessary to construct CTAKA protocol without pairings in the standard model. 
In the future, we will investigate the extraction algorithm for the standard model 
first. Then we will use the extraction algorithm to construct the CTAKA protocol 
without pairings in standard model such that it can be applied to more 
applications. 
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